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Abstract  
 
 
The main question posed in the paper is: What should be done to encourage Diaspora investments in 
Armenia? The paper makes the following recommendations to achieve this objective: 
 
• utilize Diaspora’s professional recourses; 
• create networking in all professions; 
• utilize Diaspora investment and professional capacities for Armenia’s gradual integration into 
the world economy;  
• promote regional economic cooperation; 
• promote the self-organization of the Diaspora via the policy pursued by Armenian authorities; 
• conduct market research on Armenia’s export capacity abroad; 
• establish the supremacy of law in all the spheres of business for the confidence-building of 
Diaspora investors towards Armenia and for the abolishment of “privileged” conditions; 
• implement joint studies with the Diaspora for the choice of strategic partners and 
comprehensive analyses of the investment climate; 
• establish regular business forums  that represent Armenia’s economic potential abroad by 
best utilizing the Diaspora’s professional potential; 
 
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Armenian International Policy Research Group. Working Papers describe 
research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
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The Diaspora as Armenia’s Comparative Advantage 
 
For the efficient utilization of the Diaspora’s potential, encouraging an inflow of its 
investments and enhancing its role in Armenia, it is necessary to analyze what has been done 
so far, pragmatically assess the reality, reveal the obstacles and develop a comprehensive 
plan of activities to overcome them. 
 
The efficient utilization of the Diaspora’s investment potential cannot be isolated from global 
trends and regional development shifts.  Nowadays, new developments are observed in the 
world that touch upon the vital interests of both Armenia and the Diaspora, and Armenia 
cannot disregard these challenges. 
 
It is necessary to work out and implement a current and prospective far-reaching plan of 
economic integration with the Diaspora.  There has been no thorough conception of its 
professional and business potential so far. 
 
For effective cooperation, it is necessary to promote the Diaspora’s consolidation, utilize its 
investment and professional potential in Armenia’s gradual integration into the world 
economy, and work out joint programs for regional economic integration.  
 
What Has Been Done 
 
An enforced barrier arose between Armenia and the Diaspora in the years that followed the 
1915 Armenian Genocide, which brought about the formation of the Diaspora.  In the recent 
several years, Diasporan Armenians have definitely united around the Armenian Republic to 
support the Karabagh movement, establish democracy, offer material contribution to the 
Armenian population, and develop the country’s economy. 
 
If before 1998, a tendency to undermine the Diaspora’s political structures and to indirectly 
impede active business in the homeland was observed, after 1998 numerous attempts were 
made to use the business potential of Armenia and the Diaspora, and to accomplish their 
political unification.  Two wide-ranging Armenia-Diaspora conferences were been organized 
with participation of representatives from almost all the communities of the Diaspora.  In any 
event, no long-lasting cooperation strategy, plan, or relevant mechanisms have been worked 
out yet. 
 
Despite the fact that approximately 2000-3000 Armenian citizens, not counting Diasporan 
Armenians, work in Diaspora structures supplying assistance, the decline of charitable 
activity can be observed in almost all the communities of the Diaspora today. Charity by 
organizations gave way to individual donations (approximately 7,000 people giving, on 
average, 100 USD  each ). 
 
Fourteen large organizations of the Diaspora have provided assistance of about 900 million 
USD to Armenia.  As for the support by foreign governments and non-Armenian 
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organizations, the USA undoubtedly plays a leading role. The total amount of material 
assistance provided to Armenia since independence has reached 1,493,760,000 USD. 
 
The Results of Lobbying by Diaspora Organizations  
 
The Armenian Assembly of America, Hay Dat (The Armenian Cause) Offices, and other 
Diasporan organizations lobby to increase delivery of humanitarian assistance to Armenia. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Armenian Diaspora by country1 
 
N Country Population N Country Population 
1 Russia 2,250,000 42 Cyprus  2,740 
2 U.S. 1,400,000 43 Venezuela  2,500 
3 France 450,000 44 Lithuania  2,500 
4 Lebanon  234,000 45 Latvia  2,500 
5 Ukraine  150,000 46 Italy  2,500 
6 Syria  150,000 47 Estonia  2,000 
7 Argentina 130,000 48 Thailand  1,000 
8 Poland  92,000 49 Sudan  1,000 
9 Turkey  80,000 50 Spain  1,000 
10 Iran  80,000 51 Norway  1,000 
11 Canada  80,000 52 Finland  1,000 
12 Uzbekistan  70,000 53 Chile  1,000 
13 Australia  59,400 54 Honduras  900 
14 Germany  42,000 55 New Zealand  600 
15 Brazil  40,000 56 India  560 
16 Turkmenistan  32,000 57 Mexico  500 
17 Bulgaria  30,000 58 Ethiopia  400 
18 Kazakhstan  25,000 59 Colombia  250 
19 Belarus  25,000 60 South Africa  200 
20 Greece  20,000 61 Monaco  200 
21 Uruguay  19,000 62 Quatar  150 
22 UK  18,000 63 Cuba  100 
23 Hungary  15,000 64 Dominican Rep.  75 
24 Yugoslavia  10,000 65 Ireland  50 
25 Romania  10,000 66 Singapore  35 
26 Czech Republic  10,000 67 Zimbabwe  28 
27 Moldova  7,000 68 Cote D’Ivoire 20 
28 Egypt  6,500 69 Costa Rica  20 
29 Tajikistan  6,000 70 Hong Kong  16 
30 Jordan  5,500 71 China  16 
31 Switzerland  5,000 72 Senegal  15 
                                                 
1 ARMENIA 2020, Diaspora-Homeland Issue Paper, draft by Arak-29 Foundation, 2003  
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32 Sweden  5,000 73 Ghana  15 
33 Kuwait  5,000 74 South Korea  12 
34 Belgium  5,000 75 Zambia 10 
35 Kyrgyzstan  3,285 76 Luxembourg  10 
36 UAE 3,000 77 Japan  10 
37 Netherlands 3,000 78 Indonesia  10 
38 Israel  3,000 79 Vietnam  8 
39 Iraq  3,000 80 Swaziland  8 
40 Denmark  3,000 81 Philippines  8 
41 Austria  3,000    
 
70-90 percent of the humanitarian assistance delivered through Armenian organizations is of 
non-Armenian origin.  Though the lobbing by Diasporan Armenian structures is a matter of 
separate study, the following results are worth mentioning. In 1991, with the joint efforts of 
the Armenian Assembly of America and a number of other national structures, it was 
possible to adopt a bill to provide US assistance only to the former republics of the Soviet 
Union with democratic leadership. In 1992, the US Congress passed the Freedom for Russia 
and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act which 
provides that United States assistance under that or any other act may not be provided to the 
government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to Congress, that the 
government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other 
offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh. (Section 907 of the 
FREEDOM Support Act). Thus the US State Department allocated 505.8 million USD to 
assist the democratization process in former Soviet republics and an additional 12.3 billion 
USD to the IMF for granting various loans to the  republics. Owing to the Armenian lobby in 
the Diaspora, US assistance to Armenia in 1993 was 146 million USD and in 1992-1994 200 
million USD. In July 1994, the US Senate approved the draft decision to allocate 75 million 
USD within the framework of 1994foreign assistance  to Armenia, 5 million of which was 
allocated to the Transcaucasus Enterprise Fund to make investments in the Transcaucasus.  In 
1992-1995 the Armenian Diaspora lobby succeeded in extracting from the US 445 million 
USD. For fiscal year 1995-1996, 150 million USD was allocated to the Ukraine, 80 million 
USD to  Jews from the former USSR and Eastern Europe to settle in Israel, 15 million USD 
to newly married couples from Russia, and 75 million USD to Armenia, out of 839 million 
USD allocations approved by the US Senate Commission in 1995. In 1998 efforts were made 
to ban Section 907. Despite the efforts made by Azerbaijani lobbyists, Armenia was granted 
85 million USD, Nagorno Karabagh 20 million USD and Georgia 90 million USD. 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Congress heeded the 
administration’s request and granted the President authority to waive Section 907. In 
September 2002, the US Congress asserted the formula to grant approximately 87 million 
USD assistance to Armenia. In general, in 2003 the amount of assistance was more than 
requested. Finally, it has been decided to move from charity into effective cooperation.  
 
Some Results of the Experience of Utilizing the Diaspora’s Potential in Other Countries 
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At a certain stage of its history, any nation, as an ethnic entity, establishes a state as the 
highest formation of its national self-determination.  When established, the state forms civil 
society.  When strengthened,  civil society protects the state.  While Armenia is striving to 
utilize the Diaspora’s potential effectively, other countries and people have already achieved 
significant results in putting to their own country’s advantage the business and professional 
potential of their compatriots who live in various parts of the world but have the same 
national roots.  Especially  edifying are  the cases of Indian, Chinese, Israeli, Italian, Irish, 
and Mexican economic reforms and rapid development in terms of the formation of the 
national economy, and the realization of its competitive advantages. 
 
In these countries, the Diaspora actively participates in the economic development process, 
thus fostering the realization of goods and services––local entrepreneurship––in foreign 
markets, as well as creating joint productions, and investing in various spheres of the 
economy.  The development of information technologies in the Indian economy, for instance, 
is mostly preconditioned by investments by ethnic Indians, which amount to 25 billion USD.  
Owing to this fact, today more than 200,000 specialists in  the  field are working in India on 
long-term contracts.  Due to the Indian Diaspora’s coordinated activities, 30% of the 
employees of Microsoft  are ethnic Indians. 
 
Those examples certify that owing to  traditional ethnic and cultural contacts, the effective 
use of the Diasporan potential and the conveyance of management and professional skills can 
foster gradual integration of national economy into the world financial system, which is an 
imperative for countries with transitional economies. 
 
Analysts sometimes compare the situation in Armenia in the first years of independence with 
the situation in Israel in the mid-1950s.  In the years of the Karabagh conflict, Armenians––
in the homeland and afar––unified to some extent, to face the national challenges.  The 
existing prerequisites indicated that, if following Israel’s example, the transition to the 
market economy would be successful in Armenia.  Armenia led other USSR countries in 
terms of high-level education and industrial production.  Owing to its unique role in the 
sphere of high technology, it was considered to be the Silicon Valley of the  USSR.  Taking 
into consideration the scientific industrial potential Armenia had in that period, there were all 
the necessary grounds to suppose that Armenia would succeed in surmounting the difficulties 
of transition into democracy. 
 
In 1990, Armenia, with a population of 3.5 million, looked forward to the Diasporan 
contribution.  For a small country like Armenia, the Diaspora was a wonderful source of 
development resources:  more than one million people live in the USA, another million live 
in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America.  Armenians abroad are quite successful 
economically and professionally, and constitute socially and politically well-organized 
national communities.  In addition, Armenians today, like previously, rely on the goodwill of 
Russia––their traditional, presently also strategic partner––where more than 1.5 million 
Armenians live.  Many Russian Armenians have been quite influential in the Kremlin. 
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In a transitional period, serious economic breakdowns are not rare.  Both objective and 
subjective factors play a role in this, such us the landlocked territory, the consequences of the 
1988 earthquake,, and the loss of traditional markets after the USSR’s demise.  In conclusion, 
the country seemed to have great potential and wide opportunities to succeed.  In any event, 
it should be noted that with all the commonalities between Armenia at the current stage and 
Israel in the post-independence period, there are also numerous differences which are 
accounted for the degree of each nation’s effective /non-effective unification. 
 
First, the majority of the Diasporan Armenians don’t have any historical connection with 
present-day Armenia.  They are western Armenians from the region that constitutes part of 
Turkey, and for most of them Armenia is more an idea than a country that can become a 
possible place of residence.  Noteworthy is the fact that more eastern than western 
Armenians, especially from Iran, have found dwelling in Armenia.  Some people explain this 
by the similarity of lifestyle and culture, and other commonalities. 
 
Second, 70 years of socialism in Armenia created a cultural divide with its non-former Soviet 
Union Diaspora that has no parallel for Israel. This divide is largely responsible for the fact 
that the Diaspora has little cultural affinity with Armenia.   
 
The third and  most obvious difference is that in contrast to Israel, the Armenian Diaspora 
does not have an ideological foundation for supporting Armenia, as there is with Zionism. 
This explains why the Diaspora’s support for Armenia is less institutionalized and strategic 
and more individualistic and project-specific.  
 
The creation of an independent Armenian state was never a part of the traditional agenda of 
the mainstream Diaspora in Soviet times. The opposite view was the most popular -- that 
Armenia could not become an independent state in face of the dangers of pan-Turkism. As a 
result, the Armenian Diaspora was ideologically quite unprepared to deal with an 
independent Armenia. After ten years of independence, it failed to switch from its traditional 
cultural and nationalistic agenda to a new agenda of supporting the formation of a new 
independent national state.  
 
While all the issues related to the Genocide and restitution are of major historical and 
humanitarian significance, it is still an agenda of the past, while the nation engaged in 
building its statehood is in dire need of a positive agenda related to its current and future 
strategy. For instance, the Diaspora in the US has never tried to use its political leverage to 
push Turkey toward opening its border with Armenia; while this is a major development 
issue for the Armenian state, it has never been high on the Diaspora’s list. Moreover, the very 
tough position of the Diaspora on the Genocide made inter-governmental relations between 
Armenia and Turkey even more difficult and dramatically reduced chances for opening the 
Turkish border for Armenian goods and services.  
 
In addition, internal political divisions in the Armenian Diaspora seem to be a surprisingly 
important constraint for developing a consolidated Diaspora strategy for supporting a new 
Armenian development agenda. These political divisions are to a major extent based on 
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tradition and much less on real differences in current politics. The dividing line for most 
Diaspora Armenians is still a policy towards Turkey.  
 
Assessment  
 
It is estimated that the GDP in Armenia amounts to just two-thirds of its 1990 level, 60% of 
the population lives in poverty, about 40 percent of the labor force is unemployed, de facto 
there is no middle class, and export capacity is weak. These all witness the inefficient 
utilization of Diaspora participation and its professional and economic potential.  
 
The inflow of Diasporan investments has also been much below expectations. In total during 
1995-2000, Armenia received on average less than 30 USD of foreign direct investments per 
capita, while Slovenia and Lithuania attracted more than 100 USD per capita, and Estonia, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic more than 200 USD. It is notable that a surprisingly large 
part of Diasporan assistance has come from Russia and the near abroad and not from the 
West. As estimated, the volume of annual private remittances of expatriates to their families 
and relatives in Armenia amounts to about 300 million USD. Annual official transfers and 
contributions allocated for loan projects constitute approximately 240 million USD, which is 
about 11% of the GDP and amounts to the Armenian dram equivalent of 75 USD per capita.   
 
A number of Diaspora businessmen have their share in Armenian banking capital.  However, 
this tendency is not very developed and widespread. Not only investments in banking capital 
but also deposits are profitable for  Diaspora Armenians. On the one hand it is profitable for  
Diaspora investors since they receive a higher interest rate for deposits in Armenia than in 
developed countries; on the other hand, deposit turnover as loans for local entrepreneurs are 
utilized for the sake of the establishment and development of an effective structure for the 
Armenian economy.   
Box 1. Age and Generation in the Diaspora 
 
Older Diasporans 
? Are more likely to trust the government and agree it should take the lead (double) 
? Are more trusting in general 
 
Middle-aged Diasporans 
? Most concerned with having more of the Diaspora buying Armenian products 
? Armenia developing world-class companies 
? Value charity less than either the young or the old 
 
Third generation wants to provide information, networks and expertise as opposed to charity 
 
Nevertheless, the humanitarian aid received from the Diaspora has not as much contributed 
to meeting social requirements as to establishing clans and promoting the centralization of 
economic potential, the development of monopolies and the polarization of the society. 
Diaspora Armenians’ willingness to provide assistance to the governmental level in the end 
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fades as they become aware of its appropriation by state officials.  With the exception of 
single cases, it has not contributed to the development of private entrepreneurship.   
 
The efforts that various Diasporan structures made to provide extensive material assistance to 
the Republic of Armenia are not in harmony with the steps to utilize the assistance for 
project-specific goals. Nearly no systemized project was implemented to train the Armenian 
businessmen to change their mentality to meet the current trends and challenges of global 
economy. The principles of sound competition and entrepreneurship typical of a liberalized 
economy that could have been exported from the Diaspora have not taken root in the 
Armenian reality.  
 
The lack of unity in economic and professional potential and its further effective application 
have resulted in a “brain drain,” – a waste of business potential and mass exodus from 
Armenia. 
 
All the preceding facts have their explanations and reasons. The strategy to promote 
Diasporan investments in Armenia should be based not only on the commonalities and 
enhancing factors but also on understanding  key issues and obstacles, and overcoming them.  
 
One may single out culture, customs, traditions, the system of moral values, religion, church, 
homeland, and the maintenance and reproduction of national identity as commonalities. The 
Armenians have a common history and historical experience, common values and ideas, 
concerns and aspirations, a common spirit of solidarity; they speak a common language of 
the same origin. The most characteristic commonality is the common interest of worldwide 
Armenians––to rebuild the homeland of all Armenians, promote the strength of its national 
economy and provide dignified living standards.  
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Figure 1 
Appreciation for the Diaspora
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
The Armenian Diaspora is a positive force for change in
Armenia. 
The government of Armenia should take the lead in
organizing the Armenian Diaspora to play a positive role in
the country 
When investing in Armenia, Diasporans care more about
making money for themselves than about the progress of
the country 
Percent Agree
Armenia Diaspora
There is overwhelming support for the role that the Diaspora has played and should play in the future 
of Armenia, although most respondents in both Armenia and the Diaspora endorse more organization 
of the Diaspora, either through the Diaspora itself, the government or some combination. 
 
Source: Aslan Global Survey of Armenians in Armenia and the Diaspora, February-April 2003 
 
One may single out the following among the obstacles: 
 
• the dispersion of the societies constituting the Diaspora who speak with different 
voices, have different mentalities and approaches, and different expectations from 
Armenia and the Diaspora, so that no organization, individual or collectively can 
speak on behalf of the Diaspora; 
• the non-homogeneity of  Diaspora Armenians, not only in geographical sense -- that 
is, with different imprints of the given local countries, as well as  “old and new 
Diasporan Armenian ” cultures (deported from Baku and Sumgait, emigrants to the 
USA and Europe from Armenia and other CIS countries), but also with different 
world outlooks and different approaches to cultural interrelations, which do not allow 
them to organize themselves as a pan-Armenian structure; 
• the non-systemic and -coordinated character of the financial aid provided for 
Armenia, and the absence of coordination of business and cultural programs, which 
reduces the effectiveness of Diaspora participation in any program; 
• the nearly full blockade of land communications with Armenia, which makes 
economic business cooperation with the Diaspora costly, increases the cost price and 
the price of commodities of Diasporan investors for consumption  abroad; 
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• the low  level of awareness between Armenia and the Diaspora, patronizing and 
pretentious postures, prejudices, and misunderstandings of different aspects have 
developed an atmosphere of disregard and mistrust towards each other; 
• the politicization and partisanship of some segments of the Diaspora, which prohibits 
the coming together of  communities even in the most compact regions and 
effectively utilizing their force for investments in Armenia; 
• the lack of the country’s priorities and overall, statewide programs, which does not 
allow the Diaspora to have a clear idea of the role they assume and the possibilities to 
utilize their professional potential;  
• the postponement of the discussion of dual citizenship, which prevents a number of 
Diasporan Armenians from obtaining the real estate that would help to multiply their 
investments in their homeland; 
• the absence of the rule of law, which  results in mistrust, and consequently, a 
reduction in investments; 
• the unequal status of the Diaspora and Armenia as partners; Armenia is a country 
with a homogeneous population in a geographical-political special environment 
where there are joint approaches on both internal and external factors, whereas every 
community of the Diaspora has its own approaches and perceptions; 
• the isolation of a large number of Diasporan Armenians from the economic, cultural, 
and political life of their given country, which does not allow them to integrate into 
the economy and to have relations with foreign businessmen, and business and 
professional structures, thus limiting the expected material and professional 
investments;  
• the appropriation of a number of Diaspora investments by  clans established in 
Armenia, the revelation of which make them cease investment programs; 
• the lack of preconditions for economic security and its separate constituents, which 
causes an unstable investment climate and prevents long-term investments; 
• Diaspora Armenians’ contributions to Armenians immigrated from Armenia who live 
in different countries. A considerable part of Armenians believes his/her mission 
towards Armenians is thus fulfilled. It is tangible and visible while the assistance 
donated to the people of Armenia via authorities is more often out of control. 
 
Diaspora-Diaspora Relations and the Self-Organization of the Diaspora as a Systemized 
Departure Point  
The Change of the Role of the Diaspora and its Expected Mission During Independence 
 
Parallel to discussing the non-homogeneity of the Diaspora, this paper aims to analyze the 
causes of its establishment, and its geopolitical and political economic preconditions, in the 
interests of the maximum utilization of the capacities of the Diaspora. This  approach will 
contribute to raising awareness of the Diaspora, and creating real expectations for utilizing its 
potential.  
 
From the vantage point of the formation of the Diaspora, it can historically be divided into 
old, new and newest periods. The development of old Diaspora in its turn dates back to 
mainly the half of 19th century, while more massively it was formed with the establishment 
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of colonies in the first quarter of the 20th century. Currently considerable part of Armenians 
living in CIS countries settled after 50s of the 20th century when peasants were granted 
passports in the USSR. Their majority has migrated from the Armenian settlements from 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. They mostly settled down mainly in the southern parts of Russia, 
and in the republics of Central Asia. The considerably new Diaspora was formed with the 
wave of late 1970s and 1980s emigrants’ exodus from Armenia as a result of former 
Diasporan Armenian immigrants’ dissatisfaction after WWII their return to homeland and in 
their opinion, manifestation of discrimination between themselves and the indigenous people, 
as well as for improvement of socio-economic conditions. The development of the old 
Diaspora in its turn dates back to mainly the mid-19th century, while it was formed in greater 
mass with the establishment of colonies in the first quarter of the 20th century. The formation 
of the newest Diaspora began with mass emigration as a result of economic and social crises 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The emigration from Armenia resulted not as much 
from political shifts as from the search for more favorable conditions for survival. That is 
why the emigration is oriented not only to the countries of opposite political poles, but also to 
the near abroad, where there are considerably more favorable conditions for the development 
of minimal standards of living. 
 
It should be mentioned that at the threshold of independence, Armenia faced serious 
immigration problems in the form of refugees and Armenians deported from Azerbaijan. 
Their number increased at the expense of the Armenians returning from Georgia, Abkhazia, 
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This trend has not only deteriorated the socioeconomic 
situation in Armenia, but also caused the replacement of Armenians in the Diaspora itself. 
 
Second, the Diaspora can be conventionally divided into the far Diaspora, and the near 
Diaspora. The far Diaspora, as a rule, is represented by already formed old and new Diaspora 
communities, added to as a result of new trends of emigration. As for the near Diaspora, even 
if it existed previously, it was not organized, and the Armenians living in those countries 
were dissolved among the locals and were well-integrated into the socio-economic and 
political life. Since independence, Armenian communities have begun to form in Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and elsewhere. No less important is the fact that though it was the acute 
problems during newly independent statehood that caused the exodus, the existence of 
diplomatic missions—the Armenian embassies and head consulates in near Diaspora 
countries, at least morally, promoted the organization   and formation of Diaspora 
communities.  
 
The possibility of involving the newest Diaspora in the economic reforms of Armenia is 
more feasible than the participation of the old and new Diasporas. This is explained by the 
fact that the representatives of the old Diaspora especially are less related to Armenia and 
have no idea on the real state of affairs in the homeland. Their perceptions are mainly 
restricted to information from the mass media. Among other things, a considerably large 
number of the representatives of the old Diaspora  have already evolved into the life of the 
host country, and do not participate in the activities of the given country’s Armenian 
community and the humanitarian aid provided to the home country from abroad. Moreover, 
the majority of them do not communicate with their compatriots in the mother tongue that 
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constitutes the culture. Most of the old Diaspora’s current generation prefer mixed marriages 
today; some do not even appreciate their Armenian heritage, and maintain only rare kinship 
relations with Armenians living in Armenia or in other communities. However, for the 
mainstream of the representatives of the new and especially the newest Diaspora, Armenia is 
a subject of everyday concern. Most of them clearly understand not only the republic’s past 
and today’s hardships, but also realistically comprehend what should be done to overcome 
the crises. As for the newest Diaspora, it is owing to its representatives’ remittances that their 
relatives and friends survive. Others feel obliged to donate the profits from their activity to 
Armenia. Meanwhile, the newest Diaspora is ready not only for investments but also for 
risky investments that are otherwise difficult to attract, for instance, the banking system, 
insurance companies, customer service and so on.  
 
The Armenian artists and intellectuals who have emigrated from Armenia recently play a 
very influential role in the cultural life of both the near and far Diaspora. The educational and 
cultural life in a number of US, European and Middle East countries has undergone special 
changes. The establishment of schools of preliminary education, secondary schools in 
Eastern Armenian, and the organization of concerts, theatrical performances, and literary 
events place the imprint of an Armenian environment in the Armenian communities, by 
strongly promoting the preservation of the Armenian identity. 
 
The utilization of Diaspora-Diaspora relations greatly promotes the organization of 
Diasporan business and the professional potential among Diasporan Armenians, first of all 
with one another, then in favor of Armenian businesses. In this respect the most organized 
communities are those of Lebanon, Syria, with traditionally developed relations, a number of 
European countries, Canada in the last 15-20 years, as well as Russian communities. 
Manifestations of the utilization of one’s own potentials and skills for Armenia’s benefit are 
the examples of the Canadian Armenian Business Council and the Union of Russian 
Armenians.  
 
Is the Diasporan Armenia the Main Investor? 
Are We Mutually Satisfied with the Role of the Diaspora in Economic Development? 
 
Any competitive advantage undergoes the stages of formation, establishment, development 
and realization. Every stage, in its turn, requires the provision of certain conditions and 
prerequisites. In this sense, by viewing the Diaspora as a competitive advantage, one should 
take into account the most favorable conditions for its realization, which will provide 
maximal results. The Diasporan Armenians who live and work in different parts of the world, 
especially in developed countries, are have the skills enough to contribute to the development 
of different branches of the Armenian economy. It takes some time to adapt to the Armenian 
environment. However, meeting their expectations to a certain degree  is an important if not 
binding condition for the development and realization of potential investors.  In contrast to 
the requirement for material compensation for their activities  in developed countries, in the 
homeland. the need to satisfy  emotional and spiritual values, as well as the correspondence 
between stereotypical perceptions and expectations towards Armenian residents and the 
Armenian environment are foremost. It is obvious that Armenia is a less attractive country as 
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a business environment nowadays. Armenia also lags behind in profitability and 
multiplication of profits, compared with not only developed industrial but also developing 
countries with transition economies where business risk is compensated by large profits from 
large markets. Consequently, prior to gaining a satisfactory level of development and the real 
encouragement of investments, the Armenian reality must be attractive either in terms of the 
development of monopolies or of privatization of various enterprises with very low prices -- 
below market value. If we take into consideration the fact that within course of time these 
factors will gradually diminish, in an environment of sound competition the patriotism of 
Diasporan Armenians, and sometimes, disinterested assistance, plays an important role in the 
development of businesses. 
 
 
Figure 2  
Views toward Armenia from the Diaspora
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
I would be willing to help Armenians bring their products to my country 
There are many Armenian products that  I would like to buy but are not
available in my region   
Armenian community organizat ions in my country are very ef fect ive 
I feel isolated f rom Armenia and I would like to strengthen my t ies to the
country 
I exchange business ideas f requently with friends and family in Armenia 
The Armenian diaspora in my region is very united.  We all know each other
and see each other regularly 
I am act ively looking for opportunit ies to make a business investment in
Armenia 
Businesses in Armenia understand the needs of consumers in my country 
Percent  A g ree
Diaspora
 
The Diaspora sees a clear role for itself in helping Armenians export their products, providing help 
with distribution, or simply as a purchaser.  However, there is a strong view that Armenian businesses 
do not understand the needs of consumers in target export markets. 
 
Source: Aslan Global Survey of Armenians in Armenia and the Diaspora, February-April 2003 
 
Often the Diasporan Armenians may be satisfied not as much from gaining profit but from 
bearing no losses. However, this all become possible if they are spiritually satisfied and if 
there is an atmosphere of trust and confidence. There is a need to found a museum of the 
Diaspora to raise the awareness level of the residents of Armenia and Diasporan Armenians 
living in different countries, and to have a comprehensive idea about the Diaspora. On the 
other hand, it is important for Diasporan Armenian not only to take part in the processes 
begun, but also to feel like active participants in the development of various programs, 
attendance of professional consultations and shaping expert assessments. It is important that 
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alongside the residents of Armenia, Diasporan Armenians also participate in the exploration 
of the needs for economic development and the search for the required elements of the 
priorities of the country’s progress. In a number of cases, the attraction of the Diasporan 
Armenians, against this background, has provided tangible results. In particular, in the 
preliminary stage of restarting the operation of the Medzamor nuclear power plant (NPP), 
most of the Diasporan Armenian specialists applied their expert research to ease the load of 
material expenses which otherwise hindered the drafting stage. In this way, the accurate 
perception by the Armenian authorities of the utilization of Diasporan Armenian professional 
skills, and the authorities’ official invitations for consultations, can become  additional 
impetus for the development of the economy and entrepreneurship, at the same time  saving 
considerable amounts of funding. In this respect, it is important that both the residents of 
Armenia and Diasporan Armenians assess the results expected from each other and recognize 
the peculiarities of the individuals who have ethnic commonalities but were brought up in 
different cultural and political environments. In this case, we can develop real expectations. 
If achieved, this goal may mutually satisfy the parties pursuing the same objectives and 
interests.  
 
Figure 3 
Views toward the Diaspora from Armenia
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Interestingly, although the Diasporans would like to help distribute Armenian products, few of those 
surveyed in Armenia have products they’d like to sell. Spurring entrepreneurship to take advantage of 
the potential business linkages with the Diaspora could decrease this gap.  Those in Armenia are 
otherwise overwhelmingly supportive of the Diaspora playing a key role in Armenia’s economic 
development. 
 
Source: Aslan Global Survey of Armenians in Armenia and the Diaspora, February-April 2003 
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What Should Be Done and How to Encourage Diasporan Investments in Armenia 
 
The following recommendations are proposed to achieve this goal: 
• consider the Diaspora’s professional recourses; 
• create networking in all professions; 
• mobilize the Diaspora’s capacity via professional networking to establish business, 
academic, cultural and educational relations and thus to promote to the formation of 
Armenia’s economy and development; 
• utilize Diasporan investment and professional capacities for Armenia’s gradual 
integration into the world economy;  
• promote regional economic cooperation via participation in joint investment 
programs with the Diaspora in order to provide tangible guarantees for sustainable 
peace and prospective development. Cooperation within the framework of the CIS, 
BSEC, TRACECA, and INOGATE are of special importance; such cooperation will 
enable Armenia to become an economic mediator among Europe, Russia and the 
Near East; 
• promote the self-organization of the Diaspora via the policy pursued by Armenian 
authorities; 
• analyze and consider the comparative and absolute advantages of the Diaspora and 
Armenia -- for instance, chemical, light, electro-technical, instrument-making, 
machine-tool construction industries, software programming, jewellery, diamond-
making; develop a program and conception for their utilization; 
• conduct market research on Armenia’s export capacity abroad; 
• establish the supremacy of law in all the spheres of business for the confidence-
building of Diasporan investors towards Armenia and for the abolishment of 
“privileged” conditions; 
• combine joint efforts for working out legislative acts and promoting their adoption by 
the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia; 
• provide a conception and program for  Diasporan businesspeople on Armenia’s 
foreign trade and foreign economic relations;  
• implement joint studies with the Diaspora for the choice of strategic partners and 
comprehensive analyses of the investment climate; 
• found a governmental structure on Diasporan issues beyond the framework of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which will closely cooperate on investment issues  with 
the governmental structure coordinating foreign economic relations. 
• provide the Diaspora’s presence not only in the implementation of business and 
cultural programs but also in its active participation in their development and 
discussion; 
• establish regular business forums  that represent Armenia’s economic potential 
abroad by best utilizing the Diaspora’s professional potential; 
• found a representative network of the Union of Manufacturers and Businessmen of 
Armenia (UMBA) in the Diaspora for constant relations with local business and 
professional structures and use of the information and diplomatic potential of the 
Armenian embassies and consulates;  
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• provide information to Diasporan Armenian investors on the opportunities to 
participate in the privatization of the enterprises which are considered state property; 
• attract foreign portfolio investments, in particular from developed and developing 
countries, thus promoting the enhancement of the stock market and growth of the 
economy; 
• create a pan-Armenian information system and computer network;   
• utilize the Diaspora’s potential for providing computers and Internet connection in 
schools; 
• set up scholarships for  gifted students in Armenia and the Diaspora to study in the 
Republic of Armenia; 
• provide goal-oriented long-term and short-term training of Armenian specialists in the 
Diaspora;  
• increase the role of Diasporan Armenians in the development of new technologies, in 
acquiring and disseminating knowledge, attraction of new markets of goods and 
services and promotion of Armenian business; 
• create an information bank of Diasporan specialists;  
• jointly publish periodicals; 
• create a pan-Armenian television station; 
• found a pan-Armenian university; 
• establish a regional medical and health center; 
• develop and implement joint investment programs; 
• create a pan-Armenian international bank.  
 
These all will be possible to realize with the support and participation of separate structures 
of the Diaspora and international organizations, donor countries, public professional 
organizations and competent specialists. 
 
The above-mentioned key issues cannot be effectively solved by the Government of the 
Republic of Armenia or any other governmental structure. Armenia should pursue a 
governmental policy to utilize the Diaspora and to increase its investments, but the programs 
to work out and implement this should be all-national, pan-Armenian. It is difficult to solve 
any of the mentioned issues with bureaucratic constraints. Instead, the division of duties and 
labor among professional and business structures, non-partisan and independent individuals   
seems expedient. This will, in the end, enable  horizontal cooperation involving the most 
circles, efficiently utilize Diasporan professional experience and knowledge, and increase 
investments in individual and all-governmental programs.   
 
Thus, the Diasporan potential can gradually turn into the key competitive advantage for 
Armenia, conditioned by a detailed study of its (first of all, professional) resources, a realistic 
assessment, and the creation of networking, as well as by an adjustment of its mission and 
expected functions in Armenia, and the provision of the Diaspora’s potential participation in 
economic revival and goal-oriented utilization methods. The systematic implementation of 
the these joint arrangements with the Diaspora may not only promote the strengthening of 
Armenia-Diaspora relations but also make it possible to efficiently utilize Armenia’s 
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comparative and absolute advantages and integrate the national economy into the world 
market, taking into account the  key trends and competitiveness requirements of the last. 
 
Box2 A professional approach is most important 
(Interview with Armand Pinarbasu, President of Grant Thornton Amyot Ltd.) 
 
- How do you evaluate investments made in Armenia by the Diaspora? 
- When Armenia became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it 
found itself confronted with numerous needs. The Earthquake that had hit 
Armenia prior to that exacerbated the problems further. Naturally, large-scale 
humanitarian assistance by the Diaspora was a necessary and normal step. 
However, as time went by and heavy investments were made in the development 
of the country’s infrastructures, new opportunities presented themselves to private 
investors from the Diaspora. At present we are not in the same situation as ten 
years ago. Now an entrepreneur from the Diaspora can come, do business and 
make profit, thus also promoting the country’s development. 
- How would you describe the business environment in Armenia from the 
perspective of a Diaspora Armenian? 
- There is not a single country in the world where they would say, “Come to us and 
we will give you money.” In other words, in any place an entrepreneur has to 
work to make profit. Of course, an entrepreneur needs to have other talents to be 
able to work in Armenia than those that are required, say, in France. But in either 
country he has to toil in the sweat of his brow. Business requires professionalism; 
it is not dependent on a country or religion or denomination; profit is all that 
matters. The institutional structure of today’s Armenia is sufficient for normal 
work. The only obstacle, perhaps, is the habit of working without documents and 
formal legalization. That habit does more harm than good. Business cooperation 
between the Diaspora and Armenia will only benefit from relying on 
professionalism. 
- Aren’t the emotional attitudes of the Diaspora entrepreneurs towards Armenia 
counterproductive in terms of business? 
- It is true that Diaspora Armenians have a special attitude towards Armenia. They 
are more considerate and more attentive to this country. However, I believe that 
such an attitude has so far impeded professional business. There have even been 
instances of misunderstanding, fraud and conducting business without proper 
documentation. When the laws, business conditions, and situation are changed, 
merely verbal agreements and mutual trust are frequently not enough to achieve 
the satisfaction of both parties. 
- What is your opinion about dual citizenship, and what will it bring about in terms 
of the development of business ties between the Diaspora and Armenia? 
- Armenian citizenship, first of all, fills a Diaspora Armenian with pride. I have a 
French passport. It says that I was born in Turkey. Unfortunately, in 1923 Turkey 
forced my family to change their last name. Thus, what binds me, as a Diaspora 
Armenian, with the Armenians here?  I am currently in Armenia, I do speak 
Armenian, and my family is Armenian; nevertheless, I do not have an Armenian 
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passport. I would be happy to have an Armenian passport, too. But I also have 
interests, desires and concerns. I am not a superman to give up my French 
citizenship so as to get an Armenian passport. One may analyze and speculate a 
lot why it is so. However, the hard fact is that we retain our French passports; 
thus we cannot get Armenian ones, though we would very much like to have 
them as well. A Diaspora Armenian would like to obtain Armenian citizenship , 
and as regards the conditions and limitations, those could be subject to debate. 
Both the Diaspora and Armenia would benefit from dual citizenship.   
       
      Atom Margarian (Center for Economic Law) 
 
 
What Role Should the Diaspora Play in Armenia’s Future? 
The Discontinuity Between Political Ambitions and Development Potential  
 
On the surface, the problem looks like a failure of communication: Armenia expects the 
Diaspora to bring economic prosperity to the homeland, and the Diaspora wants Armenia to 
resemble  the homeland of its dreams. Neither has happened, thus far. Few Diaspora 
Armenians can call Armenia “home”, and Armenia is still in impoverished, post-Soviet 
chaos. Yet, the problem is not one of communication—it is political.. Each side has to better 
articulate what it expects from the other, and what it offers in return. The relationship 
between the two sides should be brought down from the current emotional level to a political 
one. The rich, diverse, and well-connected Armenian Diaspora could make a difference in the 
current economic, but more importantly, societal crisis in Armenia. And, in return, an 
Armenian Republic that satisfies its own population, and provides them with the conditions 
to exercise their social, political, and economic rights, will certainly please, and create 
conditions to further the interest and attract the engagement of, the Diaspora.  
 
In order to achieve such collaboration, representatives of Armenia and the Armenian 
Diaspora should agree upon a reformist project for Armenia, and push for a new social 
contract between the Armenian authorities and the representatives of various sectors of the 
Armenian population living in Armenia or abroad. Without a reformed, that is, a politically 
stable, multicultural, democratic Armenia, it will be difficult to attract the interest and 
engagement of Armenians living under such diverse conditions as the realities of Argentina, 
California, Moscow, Beirut, etc. On the other hand, the engagement of the Diaspora is 
imperative to make the so-called “transition” conclude with success in a post-Soviet, land-
locked, Armenia with hardly three million inhabitants.  
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Armenia’s Expectation from the Diaspora: Cash or Know How? 
 
Officials in Yerevan have, to different degrees, insisted on the importance of the Diaspora. In 
the first year of independence, the role of the Diaspora was seen as providing humanitarian 
assistance, while in the late 90’s the discourse started to shift towards calls for investment.  
 
 
Figure 4 
The most effective ways for the Diaspora to help Armenia are...
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Yet the current policy of Armenia towards the Diaspora has its limitations. What Yerevan is 
asking for is direct investments, without providing the necessary conditions for such 
investments in return. The Armenian economy does not permit large scale investment from 
abroad, although in order to solve its current socio-economic problems, such as massive 
unemployment, de-industrialization, a disbalance in foreign trade, mounting foreign debt, 
etc., it needs such  massive foreign investment. Yet the lack of an independent legal system, 
red tape, and insecurity add to the risks of economic activity in Armenia, which include a 
small market, low purchasing power, and lack of means of transportation.  
 
An additional difficulty is the monopolistic nature of certain sectors of Armenia’s economy. 
Well-connected oligarchs already dominate  the most lucrative sectors of the economy, and 
do not tolerate competition. These sectors include the import of consumer goods, energy, and 
light industry. Foreign investors, among which small and medium size Diaspora investors 
could also be included, have to go to high-risk and long-term investment sectors such as 
chemical industries, electronics and computing, the airport, etc. In spite of the official 
encouragement “to come and invest”, stories of corruption and take-overs of shares continue 
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to create obstacles. If patriotism helps to buy a ticket to visit Armenia, it is not enough of an 
argument to part with one’s life savings, without any guarantee of profit, and without any 
state protection.  
 
The other problem of the currently applied policy is that it is static and not dynamic. What is 
asked from the Diaspora is to invest to improve the current economic conditions, but not to 
use their know-how, contacts and imagination to bring about radical change within  
Armenian society. What is asked is money, and what is needed, in fact, is investment of time. 
The Contradiction between Diaspora Politics and Armenian Economics  (or The 
Contradiction between Politics in the Diaspora and Economics in Armenia) 
 
The Armenian authorities are not the only ones to blame for the situation. Armenia, in 
general, lacks the experience to communicate in a modern, multicultural language. In order to 
attract a diverse Diaspora living in the most pluralist cultural, linguistic, social and religious 
conditions, the political, but equally the cultural, economic and social key circles in the 
country should be up to the challenge. But after decades of being a closed border-post of the 
Soviet camp, the country is not equipped to play such a role. Therefore, the factor of the 
Diaspora is important to play the role of bridging this gap between local potential and global 
development. 
 
Therefore, the future development of Armenia, and its relationship with its Diaspora, is 
locked in a dialectical logic: Only to the extent that Armenia becomes modernized will it 
attract the engagement of the Diaspora; but, in order to modernize, the engagement of the 
Diaspora is a necessary factor.  
 
Then, the question is what forces are pushing Armenia toward modernization, toward reform, 
and what is the role of the Diaspora here? The organized element of the Diaspora, its political 
parties and leading institutions (Tashnaktsoutyun, Ramgavar Azadagan, Hnchagyan parties), 
have evaded taking this challenge. The traditional Diaspora parties, after failing to 
understand the significance of the Karabakh movement and the depth of the Soviet decay in 
1988, came to Armenia to establish their party branches and  engage in official politics – 
which is all about taking power and applying one’s political choices. After more than a 
decade of political activity in Armenia, it is time for the traditional parties to decide whether 
it was a correct strategy to return as functioning parties in Armenia, and what their presence 
in the country brought as added value? In any case, by coming to Armenia, the traditional 
Diaspora-based parties have failed to play the role of stimulus for any reformist or 
modernizing project, and as a result tacitly support the current status quo. 
 
Next to the traditional parties, new Diaspora organizations have evolved since Armenia’s 
independence. One such example is the Armenian Assembly of American, and the later 
version of it that appeared in Europe, the Forum of Armenian Associations of Europe. These 
two structures, which have succeeded in gaining  a certain influence, limit their activity to 
lobbying for Armenia’s interests in Washington and Brussels, getting additional foreign aid, 
getting support for the Armenian point-of-view in the Karabakh conflict, and fighting to 
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receive recognition for the Genocide. However, like the traditional parties, the Assembly and 
the Forum have been reluctant, or have failed, to develop their own vision of the changes 
necessary within Armenia. 
  
In the same period, dozens of Armenians from the Diaspora came to the land of their 
ancestors and started various economic activities. Many among them had negative 
experiences, either because of the arbitrariness of the state bureaucracy, or because their 
business partners cheated them. Most of them do not have any organized structure to turn to. 
Even those parties or associations considered to represent the Diaspora have, thus far, failed 
to stand up for the economic rights and interests of the Diaspora in Armenia.  
Inconsistencies in Organizational Culture: The Example of the Two Conferences 
 
Eight years after Armenia achieved independence, the first Armenia-Diaspora conference 
was organized. In September 1999, hundreds of official delegates representing various 
Diaspora communities arrived to Yerevan to meet with Armenian officials. The authorities in 
Yerevan later claimed that it was the tragic killings in the parliament of October 27th that 
stopped the process started in the conference. It is true that the parliament killings paralysed 
all Armenian political institutions for long months, yet it is difficult to imagine how the work 
started in the conference could have had any practical continuation. The conference itself was 
highly ceremonial and symbolic, marking a shift in Yerevan’s attitude toward the Diaspora 
(from soliciting humanitarian aid to inviting investments). Although important in itself, it  
neither mobilized any additional resources within the Diaspora nor proposed any new 
guidelines for collaboration. 
 
A second conference was held in May 2002. This second attempt aimed to be a “more 
practical, goal-oriented” one. The Armenian ministry of foreign affairs assumed all 
organizational matters. In the preparation period, little new debate took place. If the delegates 
for the first conference were chosen based on their political representation and their influence 
within their respective communities, in  the second conference, they were experts chosen by 
the foreign ministry. The debates were divided into sectors chosen to be of priority by the 
organizers. Yet, there was little preparation beforehand, and most presentations and debates 
within the workshops were disconnected monologues. The final conclusions of the 
conference witness that little valuable work was done toward a new understanding of the 
problems and  opportunities facing the two sides. In its haste for concrete results, the second 
conference failed to produce an honest debate. 
 
Outside the official conferences and their limitations, little effort has been made by non-
governmental actors either in Armenia or the Diaspora to think about the nature of the 
current crisis between the two sides, and how to ameliorate the situation. Without such input, 
even criticism or alternative visions, the official management of the relationship between the 
two sides risks continuing in the same manner: too little debate to understand the current 
mistrust and disillusionment that exist on both sides, and too many demands for practical and 
material solutions. 
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Conditions for  Future Collaboration 
 
Both presidential administrations in post-Soviet Armenia have restricted their relationship 
with the Diaspora to a handful of organizations and personalities. This policy has left out the 
major part of the Diaspora, with its rich tissue of pluralism. What they see in the Diaspora 
has been and continues to be direct financial assistance, while often they have been reluctant 
to give Diaspora actors a voice in the matters of the Republic. The traditional and newly 
formed political institutions coming from the Diaspora have failed in their turn to develop a 
different voice and vision of the path for a modern Armenia. By engaging themselves in day-
to-day politics in a field where they have little knowledge and even less control, and leaving 
other important fields open, such as lobbying in Armenia for the economic interests of the 
Diaspora, which, in its turn, could have helped transform Armenia into a place friendly to 
both foreign and local investment. 
 
The last decade was a reminder of how much the Armenian Diaspora is emotionally attached 
to the newborn republic. But if Armenia wants to profit from this enormous potential, two 
things have to change: in the short term, it should create conditions to facilitate capital 
investments that could come from the Diaspora. This means fiscal reforms, making the 
bureaucracy transparent, and guaranteeing a fair judiciary. But in the long term, the question 
is more complex. In order to sustain and mobilize wider Diaspora interest in Armenia, the 
country should be politically and culturally attractive to a diverse group of people living in 
dispersed realities. And the main question is: where will the stimulus for such reform come 
from? 
